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ABSTRACT
The standard theory of equilibrium unemployment, the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model, cannot explain the magnitude of the business cycle fluctuations in two of its central elements,
unemployment and vacancies. Modifying the model to make the present value of wages
unresponsive to current labor market conditions amplifies fluctuations in unemployment and
vacancies by an order of magnitude, significantly improving the performance of the model. Despite









A sequence of recent papers (Costain and Reiter 2003, Hall 2003a, Shimer 2003) has ar-
gued that the standard theory of equilibrium unemployment, the Mortensen-Pissarides
search and matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000) cannot
explain the magnitude of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in two of its central elements, un-
employment and vacancies. Firms create more vacancies in response to an increase in
labor productivity. This reduces the duration of unemployment, putting upward pres-
sure on wages. In a reasonably calibrated version of the economy, the wage increase
absorbs virtually all of the productivity increase, and so the shock scarcely aﬀects
unemployment and vacancies.
Hall (2003b) introduces a real wage rigidity, a backward-looking social norm, into
the Mortensen-Pissarides model, and shows that the resulting model quantitatively
matches the behavior of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S.. The wage rigidity
is socially ineﬃcient: wages are too low in expansions, inducing excessive vacancy
creation, and too high in recessions, discouraging most vacancy creation. Nevertheless,
Hall (2003b) shows that there are no bilateral gains from renegotiating the wage; every
employed worker always prefers to receive a higher wage and every employer always
wants to pay a lower wage. The model thereby avoids Barro’s (1977) critique that in
many implicit contract models, workers and ﬁrms do not exploit all the potential gains
from trade.
This paper ﬁrst reviews Shimer’s (2003) argument that the Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model cannot generate substantial ﬂuctuations in unemployment and va-
cancies. It then explores the consequences of introducing rigid wages. Although the
model’s behavior does not depend on the extent of wage ﬂexibility in existing employ-
ment relationships, it is dramatically altered if the wage for new hires is independent
of the current state of aggregate productivity. In the latter case, the model easily
generates large ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Finally, the paper asks a
variant of Lucas’s (1987) cost-of-business-cycle question. Suppose real wages are con-
stant. How much would a worker be willing to pay to eliminate the real wage rigidity,
so wages instead vary optimally over the business cycle? In a calibrated example, the
cost of the real wage rigidity is small, about 0.1 percent of lifetime consumption, even
though the rigidity ampliﬁes ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies by more than
a factor of ten. To the extent that policies designed to make real wages more ﬂexible1
are diﬃcult to implement, unevenly eﬀective, and have unintended consequences, this
1Monetary policy may have such an eﬀect if nominal wages are sticky.
1analysis suggests that they are unlikely to be desirable even in an economy in which
real wages would otherwise be ﬁxed.
2 F l e x i b l eW a g eM o d e l
I start by extending Pissarides (1985) to make labor productivity p stochastic. Because
the model has become fairly standard, I describe it only brieﬂy.2
Time is continuous. The economy consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral,3 inﬁnitely-
lived workers and a continuum of risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. Workers and ﬁrms
discount future payoﬀs at a common rate r>0, but I focus on limiting results as
r → 0. Workers can either be unemployed or employed. An unemployed worker gets
ﬂow utility z from non-market activity (‘leisure’) and searches for a job. An employed
worker earns an endogenous productivity-contingent wage wp but may not search.
Firms have a constant returns to scale production technology that uses only labor;
each worker yields proﬁt equal to the diﬀerence between labor productivity and the
wage, p − wp. Jobs end exogenously at rate s>0, leaving the worker unemployed
and the ﬁrm with a vacancy. In order to hire a worker, a ﬁrm must maintain an open
vacancy at ﬂow cost c.
There is a Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale matching technology,4 so that
the rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs and the rate at which vacancies are
ﬁlled depends only on the endogenous productivity-contingent vacancy-unemployment
ratio θp. More precisely, workers ﬁnd jobs at rate µθ1−α
p and vacancies are ﬁlled at rate
µθ−α
p ,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate u(t) increases with job destruction and







where p(t) is the level of labor productivity at time t.
An aggregate shock hits the economy according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate λ, at which point a new productivity p  is drawn from a distribution that depends
2See Pissarides (2000) for a textbook treatment of the deterministic search model and Shimer (2003) for
a discussion of the stochastic model.
3Alternatively one can view this as a complete markets model in which labor income risk is insured.
4Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) argue that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale.
There has been less analysis of the Cobb-Douglas assumption, which is central to the interpretation of some
of the results that follow. See Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for an estimate of a CES matching function;
they cannnot reject a unit elasticity of substitution, the Cobb-Douglas case.
2on the current productivity level p.L e tEpXp denote the expected value of an arbitrary
variable X following the next aggregate shock, conditional on the current state p.A l s o
assume that the support of the unconditional productivity distribution is compact so
this conditional expectation is well-deﬁned. Current productivity and the stochastic
process for productivity are common knowledge.
The verbal description above is precisely summarized by four Bellman equations:






































The ﬁrst pair of equations describe the value of a worker when she is unemployed
(U) and employed (E) as a function of the current productivity level p.5 If she is
unemployed, she gets current value from leisure z and ﬁnds a job at rate µθ1−α
p .T h e r e
is also an aggregate shock at rate λ, giving a capital gain EpUp − Up. When she is
employed, she earns the endogenous wage wp, loses her job at rate s, and realizes an
aggregate shock at rate λ. The second pair of equations similarly describe the value of
a job that is vacant (V ) or ﬁlled (F).
For each productivity level p, there are six endogenous variables within the four
equations (2)–(5): four Bellman values, the vacancy-unemployment ratio θp,a n dt h e
wage wp. To close the model, we need two additional equations. One is a free entry
condition for vacancies: ﬁrms create job openings until the value of a vacancy is zero,
Vp =0f o ra l lp. (6)
The other assumption, dating back at least to Pissarides (1985), is that wages are set
by asymmetric Nash bargaining. I assume here that wages are renegotiated following
each aggregate shock, which ensures that at any point in time all workers are paid a
common wage wp. Section 4 considers an extreme alternative, in which the wage in
existing jobs is ﬁxed following an aggregate shock. In the present context, the Nash






for all p, (7)
5These equations implicitly assume that the value functions are independent of the unemployment rate. It
is straightforward to show that there is an equilibrium with such a property. In fact, there is no equilibrium
in which the value functions depend on the unemployment rate or on any ‘sunspot’ variable.
3where β ∈ (0,1) represents workers’ bargaining power.
Since the six equations (2)–(7) are linear in ﬁve of the endogenous variables, Up, Ep,
Vp, Fp,a n dwp, we can eliminate these variables algebraically to get a forward-looking
non-linear diﬀerence equation for the vacancy-unemployment ratio:













It is also possible to express the wage as a function of the contemporaneous vacancy-





+( 1− β)z. (9)
Equations (8) and (9) are easily solved numerically for arbitrary parameter values,
while the unemployment rate is determined from equation (1).
3 Calibration
Table 1 shows summary statistics for productivity, wages, unemployment, and vacan-
cies using quarterly data from the U.S. from 1951 to 2001.6 Productivity and wages
are constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and
Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics. The former is measured
as real output per hour in the non-farm business sector; the latter is real hourly com-
pensation in the same sector. It is a broad measure of compensation, including wages,
salaries, tips, bonuses, and in-kind payments, as well as imputed compensation for pro-
prietors and unpaid family workers. Unemployment is measured by the BLS using the
Current Population Survey. Vacancies are crudely measured by the Conference Board
help-wanted advertising index, but this variable closely tracks direct measures of va-
cancies when they are available (Abraham 1987, Shimer 2003). All data are detrended
using a very low frequency Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 100,000,
so the detrended data include both short- and medium-frequency ﬂuctuations.
Following Shimer (2003), I calibrate the model to match this data. The parameter
choices are summarized in Table 2. Here I mention two that are particularly important
for the interpretation of the results. First, I set the discount rate to zero. Compared
with a more standard number, say 0.01 per quarter, this choice scarcely aﬀects the
6The U.S. economy is an interesting benchmark because, relative to most European economies, it is
thought to have ﬂexible wages. The ﬁnding that wages in the U.S. economy are signiﬁcantly more rigid than
in the benchmark model is therefore all-the-more surprising.
4quantitative results; however, it simpliﬁes the normative analysis because welfare only
depends on the long-run behavior of the economy and in particular is independent of
the current state. Second, I set workers’ bargaining power β equal to the elasticity of
the matching function α. Shimer (2003) proves that if β = α, the equilibrium in the
economy with Nash bargaining maximizes the expected present value of output net
of vacancy costs, even in the presence of productivity shocks, a generalization of the
Hosios (1990) condition. Again, this restriction facilitates the normative analysis.
Table 3 summarizes the model generated data. Although it is a continuous time
model, I sample the model-generated data at discrete points in time corresponding
to the end of each quarter so as to make it comparable with actual data. I chose
parameters to match the mean unemployment rate and the standard deviation and
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of labor productivity. The model-generated data can be
compared with U.S. data along the remaining dimensions. In some cases, the model
performs very well. For example, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies
in this data set is −0.90, while in the model it is −0.87, so the model can produce a
downward sloping ‘Beveridge curve’ or vacancy-unemployment relationship. On others,
the model performs less well. In the data, vacancies are slightly more persistent than
unemployment, while in the model vacancies are much less persistent. Introducing
planning lags would presumably correct this shortcoming (Fujita 2003). But the real
problem lies in the absence of volatility. The unemployment rate is 15.2 times as
volatile in the data as in the model, the vacancy rate is 11.4 times, and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is 12.5 times. The Mortensen-Pissarides model generates only a
tiny fraction of the volatility of its two central elements, unemployment and vacancies.
4 Rigid Wages in Old Matches
This section observes that the rigidity of wages in old matches does not aﬀect the
volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Consider an extreme alternative to the
previous section’s assumptions: the wage in new matches is determined by Nash bar-
gaining, but it never changes following subsequent shocks. Let wp0 denote the wage in
a match that was formed when productivity was equal to p0. The model is otherwise
5unchanged. We may express the Bellman equations as


















































where superscripts denote initial productivity and subscripts denote current produc-
tivity. The free entry condition (6) is unchanged, while the Nash bargaining solution










for all p. (14)
It is straightforward to prove that the state-contingent vacancy-unemployment ratio,
given in equation (8), is unaﬀected by this modiﬁcation of the model, since match




p −Up is independent of the initial productivity level. It follows
that the response of unemployment and vacancies to a labor productivity shock is the
same in this model as in the ﬂexible wage model.










Although the expected present value of wages as a function of initial productivity
is the same if wages are continually renegotiated and hence depend only on current
productivity (equation 9) or if they are ﬁxed for the duration of the match and hence
depend only on initial productivity (equation 15), the timing of wage payments is quite
diﬀerent. The coeﬃcient of variation on the cross-sectional average wage declines from
0.016 to 0.004, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation jumps up from 0.85 to 0.99, and the
correlation between the average wage and labor productivity drops from 1.00 to 0.62.
This exercise indicates that the volatility of wages are not informative about the success
of a model with long term employment relationships, echoing the conclusion reached
by Boldrin and Horvath (1995).
65 Rigid Wages in All Matches
Following the analysis in Hall (2003b), this section demonstrates the improved perfor-
mance of the model if the expected present value of wages in new matches is rigid. I
make an extreme assumption here and replace the Nash bargaining solution (7) with
a ﬁxed wage, wp =¯ w.7 It is simplest to view this as a social norm. All workers expect
to be paid ¯ w when employed, and all ﬁrms expect to have to pay ¯ w to any employee.
Crucially, a matched worker and ﬁrm have no incentive to renegotiate the wage. An
employed worker always prefers a higher wage, so long as this does not induce the ﬁrm
to lay her oﬀ (i.e. as long as Fp > 0), and an employer always prefers to pay a lower
wage, so long as this does not induce the worker to quit (i.e. as long as Ep >U p). I
focus throughout on a range of parameter values for which these conditions hold. An
equilibrium is a solution to equations (2)–(6), with a constant and exogenous wage.
The vacancy-unemployment ratio satisﬁes a forward-looking diﬀerential equation,











with θp truncated at zero.
I ﬁx all the parameters (except workers’ bargaining power β) at their values in Ta-
ble 2 and then characterize the equilibrium with the wage ﬁxed at ¯ w =0 .967, chosen
to replicate the appropriate average unemployment rate, 5.7 percent. Table 4 records
the results. The autocorrelations and correlation matrix are almost unchanged. For
example, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies becomes slightly less
negative, −0.85 rather than −0.87, while the lack of persistence in vacancies remains a
problem. But the variability of unemployment and vacancies rises dramatically. Unem-
ployment is almost exactly as variable in the model as in the U.S. data, while vacancies
are somewhat more variable in the model than in the data. The na¨ ıve assumption that
wages are constant signiﬁcantly improves the performance of the model.8
7A shortcoming of this assumption is that long-run productivity growth will counterfactually induce a
long-run decline in the unemployment rate. Hall (2003b) makes a more complicated assumption on wage
setting that ensures a similar behavior of the model in the short-run but a more satisfactory response to
long-run trends.
8I have also calibrated the model allowing productivity and wages to follow the joint stochastic process
observed in U.S. data. This enriches the model by adding a ‘wage shock’; however, since the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is determined by the (current and expected future) diﬀerence between productivity and
wages—see equation (16)—it is possible to reduce the driving force to a single variable, net proﬁt p − w.
I set the mean value of net proﬁt at 0.032, as in the ﬂexible wage model. U.S. data then imply that the
coeﬃcient of variation and ﬁrst order autocorrelation of net proﬁt are 0.522 and 0.858, respectively. In
response to these productivity and wage shocks, the calibrated model delivers ﬂuctuations in unemployment
76 The Welfare Cost of Rigid Wages
If rigid wages have a large eﬀect on the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates,
it seems natural that they would also have a large eﬀect on welfare. During good times,
wages are too low and so the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ is too high, while in bad
times the opposite is true. This section asks how much consumption a worker would
sacriﬁce in order to live in a world with ﬂexible wages in new matches (Sections 2–4)
rather than a world with rigid wages (Section 5). In the calibrated rigid wage economy,
average output is 0.12 percent below the level in the ﬂexible wage economies, and so
workers would give up 0.12 percent of their average consumption to move to a ﬂexible
wage economy, a negligible amount.9 While a ﬁxed real wage dramatically alters the
behavior of unemployment and vacancies, it scarcely aﬀects welfare.
There are at least two important caveats to this result. First, since workers are risk-
neutral, this calculation is based on the cost that rigid wages impose on the mean level
of consumption. The variance in consumption also matters if workers are risk-averse
and capital markets are incomplete; however, calculations by Lucas (1987) and others
indicate that the cost of consumption variability is small even in non-representative
agent economies (Imrohoroglu 1989, Atkeson and Phelan 1994, Obstfeld 1994) or in
economies with non-standard preferences (Alvarez and Jermann 2000).
Second, if the wage level is ﬁxed at a diﬀerent level, ¯ w  =0 .967, the welfare costs
may be much more signiﬁcant. But this is not really a statement about wage rigidity
in the presence of productivity ﬂuctuations; it is similarly true that if wages are ﬂexible
but workers’ bargaining power β is not equal to the elasticity α, welfare may be reduced
substantially. I leave for future research the question of why a rigid real wage might
or might not tend towards the eﬃcient level in the long-run.10
and vacancies similar to those in the ﬁxed wage model: a coeﬃcient of variation for unemployment of 0.183
and for vacancies of 0.242, with a correlation between these two key variables equal to −0.861.
9I have rigged the model so that this question is conceptually easy to answer. First, since the discount
rate is 0, the cost of rigid wages depends neither on the current state of the economy nor on the dynamics of
moving to a new ergodic employment and wage distribution. Second, in a ﬂexible wage economy, workers’
bargaining power β equals the elasticity of the matching function α, so the comparison is between a rigid
wage economy and an economy with wages that move optimally over the business cycle (Hosios 1990). And
third, since workers are risk-neutral, the proper measure of welfare is simply workers’ average consumption,
which is equal to the average output in the economy net of vacancy posting costs. When productivity is p,
the unemployment rate is u, and the vacancy-unemployment ratio is θ, net output is (1 − u)p + uz − cθu,
the sum of income from the 1 − u employed workers and from the u unemployed workers minus the cost of
the v = θu vacancies.
10One way to sidestep this issue is to ask how much consumption a worker would sacriﬁce in order
to eliminate productivity ﬂuctuations, analogous with Lucas (1987). One can compare this sacriﬁce in
economies with ﬂexible and rigid wages. Such a calculation is likely to be less sensitive to the choice of the
level of wages and bargaining power. I thank Paul Beaudry for this suggestion.
87C o n c l u s i o n
I have extended the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with the simplest
possible model of rigid wages, a constant wage. With wages determined by Nash
bargaining, unemployment and vacancies are much less variable in the model than
in the U.S. economy. A constant wage generates approximately the correct variance
for these two key variables. In other words, this model provides some support, in the
context of a modern model of equilibrium unemployment, for the Keynesian notion that
real wage rigidities exacerbate cyclical ﬂuctuations, so recessions are times when real
wages are too high. At the same time, a ﬁxed real wage need not have any signiﬁcant
welfare cost. This suggests that, to the extent government policies distort the economy
along other dimensions, policies designed to make real wages more ﬂexible are likely
to be counterproductive, even if they succeed in moderating employment and vacancy
ﬂuctuations.
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10Table 1: Summary Statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951 to 2001
puvθ w
Mean — 0.0567 — — —
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.017 0.188 0.183 0.344 0.013
Autocorrelation (1 Quarter) 0.854 0.918 0.930 0.938 0.892
Correlation Matrix puvθ w
p 1 -0.367 0.362 0.359 0.376
u — 1 -0.896 -0.949 -0.167
v — — 1 0.955 0.136
θ — — — 1 0.175
w ———— 1
Notes: Average labor productivity p is real average output per hour in the non-farm business
sector, constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) and the Current Employment Statistics (CES). The unemployment rate u is
constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted advertising index v
is constructed by the Conference Board. The wage w is real hourly compensation in the non-farm
business sector, constructed by the BLS from the NIPA and CES. Both u and v are quarterly
averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series. Productivity, unemployment, vacancies, and wages
are expressed as ratios to an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The coeﬃcient of variation
is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
11Table 2: Parameter choices
variable meaning value explanation
¯ p labor productivity: mean 1.000 Normalization
σ labor productivity: inst. std. dev. 0.016 Output per hour in the
γ labor productivity: mean reversion 0.16 non-farm business sector
r discount rate 0 Simplify welfare analysis
s separation rate 0.1 Abowd and Zellner (1985)
z value of leisure 0.4 Beneﬁt replacement ratio 40%
c vacancy cost 0.53 Normalization θ ≈ 1
µ matching function constant 1.65 Unemployment rate 5.7%
α matching function elasticity 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
β worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Decentralized equilibrium is optimal
Notes: Additional details are provided in the text. Labor productivity takes on three possible
values, 0.976474, 1, and 1.02449. A shock hits at rate λ =0 .16. If the old productivity level is
not equal to 1, it adjusts there immediately. If it is equal to 1, it moves with equal probability to
0.976474 or 1.02449.
12Table 3: Model-Generated Data, Nash-Bargaining
puvθ w
Mean 1.000 0.0569 0.0575 1.011 0.968
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.027 0.016
Autocorrelation (1 Quarter) 0.852 0.920 0.719 0.852 0.852
Correlation Matrix puvθ w
p 1 -0.957 0.975 1.000 1.000
u — 1 -0.868 -0.957 -0.957
v — — 1 0.975 0.975
θ — — — 1 1.000
w ———— 1
Note: Parameterization given in Table 2.
13Table 4: Model-Generated Data, Fixed Wage at ¯ w =0 .967
puvθ w
Mean 1.000 0.0572 0.0595 1.112 0.967
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.017 0.185 0.228 0.381 0
Autocorrelation (1 Quarter) 0.852 0.920 0.715 0.851 —
Correlation Matrix puvθ w
p 1 -0.942 0.972 0.996 —
u — 1 -0.852 -0.923 —
v — — 1 0.967 —
θ ——— 1 —
Note: Parameterization given in Table 2.
14